Sarah Ozacky-Lazar, ‘Aas Atrash A Survey of Political and National Attitudes of the Arabs in Israel October-November 2002 The Institute for Peace Research, Givat Haviva, November 2002 שרה אוסצקי-לזר ועאס אטרש סקר עמדות פוליטיות ולאומיות של הערבים בישראל אוקטובר-נובמבר 2002 Series Editors: Sarah Ozacky-Lazar and As’ad Ghanem © All Rights Reserved to The Institute for Peace Research Givat Haviva, MP Menashe 37850 Tel. 04-6309249, Fax 04-6270891 e-mail: sozacky@zahav.net.il Printed in Israel, Kislev 5763, November 2002

Summary Two years after the events of October 2000 within the Green Line, the Jewish-Arab Center for Peace at Givat Haviva initiated a national poll amongst a representative sample of Arab citizens in Israel, in order to examine their positions on political, national and civil topics. Number of respondents: 756; margin of error: 4%. This poll complements the poll conducted in September amongst residents of the Triangle Region only. The survey was conducted by “Yafa Research Institute Ltd.,” Nazareth, headed by ‘Aas Atrash. The following are the major findings of the poll: Participation in elections Prior to the advancing of elections being known, less than half of the respondents (47.8%) declared their intention to vote. When questioned again, after the declaration of early elections in January 2003, the percentage rose to 54.6%, but it is still low. 30.0% declared they will not participate and 15.4% have not yet decided (see Appendix C). This finding indicates the continuing trend of loss of confidence in the Israeli democratic system and a feeling that the Arabs do not have the ability to influence it. (In the poll conducted at the beginning of 2001, 83% of the Arabs said that they are not satisfied with their ability to influence the government in Israel.*) In addition, this political behavior is influenced by dissatisfaction with the performance of the Arab Members of Knesset and of the representative bodies as a whole. Of those who have decided to vote, 5.4% have not yet decided for whom, and another 4% refused to disclose their intentions. The following is the distribution of responses of those respondents who intend to vote: United Arab List (UAL) drops significantly and loses about half of its strength. According to the survey it will receive 17.6%, as opposed to 30% in 1999. Jabha, The Democracy Front for Peace and Equality, also drops from 21% in 1999 to 16.2% in this poll. Tajam’u, The National Democratic Alliance led by Azmi Bishara, which ran with Ahmed Tibi in the previous elections and together received 16.8%, will receive 11.9% according to this poll, and if the party runs with Ahmed Tibi, whose party, The Arab Movement for Change, receives 11.5%, they will increase their strength significantly. But the signs indicate there will not be a union between them, since Tibi is conducting negotiations with other parties. The National Arab Party, led by Mohammad Kana’an, who left the UAL, receives only 2.5%. The Labor Party rises to 12.6% amongst the Arabs, and increases its strength in comparison to 1999 (when it received 7.4%), apparently due to the return to the system of only one voting slip. The poll was taken before the election of Amram Mitzna as Chairman of the party. It is likely that his election will increase even further the Arab support for the party. Meretz rises – 8.3% as compared to 5% in 1999. And the Likud, as the ruling party, rises from 3.8% to 6.8%. Evaluation of the Current Government’s Performance 78.4% evaluate the performance of the Sharon government towards Arab citizens as bad or very bad, 16.4% - fair, 4.3% - good, and 0.9% - excellent. Evaluation of the Arab Leadership The poll examined the level of satisfaction of the Arab citizens regarding the performance of their leadership and representative institutions. Most of the respondents, 42.4%, defined the performance of the leadership as “fair.” Over twenty percent said it was good or excellent, whereas 37% defined it as bad or very bad. To the specific question regarding Arab Members of Knesset, 47.5% responded that they handle the matters of the Arab population on a “fair” level, 32% said they do not do so at all, and just over 20% are sure that the Arab Members of Knesset do indeed take care of their interests. Arab Members of Knesset are considered by about one-quarter of the Arab citizens as “the body most expressing their interests in the State of Israel.” The government earns 11.3% whereas the Supreme Follow-Up Committee only 7.7%. However, the interesting point in this question indicates that one-third of the respondents – 33.4%, believe that none of the political bodies expresses their interests – not the government, not the Knesset, not public organizations and not the Follow-Up Committee. This response shows the dissatisfaction of the citizens with their representative institutions, both on the national level as well as on the Arab community level. To the question who more promotes the interests of Arabs in Israel – the Arab Members of Knesset or the civic associations (NGO’S), the NGO’s received more approval – 36.6% said they promote the interests more, 24.8% believe that the Knesset Members do, while 29% rate the contribution of the elected politicians and the NGO’s at an equal level in promoting their interests. To the question if the Follow-Up Committee represents the overall Arab population, 33.8% answered “somewhat,” only 23% said yes, while 43% said no. To the question ‘does the Committee represent you personally,’ about 58% answered no and not at all and fewer than 20% yes. The remainder, 23.7%, said that the Follow-Up Committee represents them “somewhat.” These answers should, in our opinion, turn on a red light within the Committee, which is considered the “Parliament” of the Arabs in Israel, and its leadership should ask itself what are the reasons for the dissatisfaction of the Arab public and how this division between themselves and the public they are supposed to lead came about. In this context the high support of the respondents for the establishment of an elected representative body for the entire Arab population of Israel is interesting. 73.5% answered yes, 19.7% no and 6.8% have no opinion on the subject. It should be emphasized that portions of the Arab public are not represented on the Follow-Up Committee, such as the Druze population and the Oppositions on the Local Councils and Municipalities. The survey also asked about attitudes regarding the idea of declaring the Islamic Movement illegal, which has been raised recently by right wing Knesset Members: 59% say this is a racist decision and 20.8% see it as intended to harm the entire populace of Arab citizens in Israel. 12.1% see it as a justified decision, and in our opinion these respondents come from other religious groupings as well as secular citizens or opponents of the Islamic Movement. To the question how the declaration of illegality of the Islamic Movement would affect the political behavior of the Arabs, the distribution of responses was as follows: 20% said it would have no effect 19.8% said it would cause a boycott of Knesset elections 20.2% believe it would cause a transfer of votes to other parties whereas a majority of 33.1% states that declaring the Islamic Movement illegal would bring about the establishment of an Islamic movement or party under another name. Positions regarding the intifada and solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: The preferred solution of the respondents is the establishment of a Palestinian State alongside the State of Israel within the 1967 borders (46.9%), or with agreed-on changes in the borders (30.1%). Only a minority supports other solutions: one secular state for Arabs and Jews (9.2%), an Islamic state in all of Palestine (4.8%), or a bi-national state (3.7%). Regarding the proposal to annex Arab communities adjacent to the border to a future Palestinian State, 17.6% said they agree to the idea (similar to the 18% of residents of the Triangle Region who answered thus the previous month), whereas 61.3% oppose it. The remainder have no opinion. Would the respondents themselves agree to join a Palestinian State when it is established? About 78% refuse and 11.5% are ready to do so. The main reasons they note for their agreement are: ‘since I am a Palestinian’ (61.4%), because of the existence of manifestations of racism against Arabs (24.1%) and because of family members on the other side – 10.8%. Of those who prefer to remain in the State of Israel, almost one-half (48.4%) stated that the reason is that they ‘have become used to living in the State of Israel.’ 32.5% see a transfer to the Palestinian State as a forfeiture of their homeland and of the brotherhood of the Arab community in Israel. The economic situation plays a role only for 5.1% and the feeling of freedom in Israel as compared to what would be in a Palestinian State – 8.3%. The positions regarding the Palestinian intifada show that most of the Arab public in Israel is tired of it and would prefer that it cease (65%) while 19.3% support its continuation. 83% prefer that the intifada be non-violent on both sides, while 10.6% do not agree with this opinion; that is, they support the continuation of the Palestinian struggle until the Palestinians achieve political objectives. What is the role of Arabs with Israeli citizenship in the intifada? – Over 44% see it as a political role only, 22.2% moral and financial, and 15.6% say they should remain neutral. 10.3% believe that the Arabs can play no role in the current conflict. As an Institute dealing with improvement of relations between Arabs and Jews, we asked what can be done to achieve such improvement. 35.6% see achievement of equality between Arabs and Jews as the preferred method of improving relations. 31% recommend joint social and economic activity and meetings between the two sides. 10.2% support joint political activity. That is, altogether 76.8% see cooperation between Jews and Arabs in various facets of life as the way to improve relations. 13.5% say there is no need for this because it is very difficult to change the current situation. 64.4% would be willing to participate in joint activity with Jews, 25.8% do not want to do so, and about ten percent say they have no opinion on the subject. The results of the poll show a number of central trends amongst the Arabs in Israel: 1. Disappointment and dissatisfaction with the political system, both national and internal. 2. A decrease in the number of those ready to participate in the Israeli political game; a decrease in support for most of the Arab parties, except for a slight increase for Tajam’u (Bishara) and a significant increase for the Movement for Change (Tibi). An increase in voting for Jewish parties – Labor, Likud and Meretz. 3. A clear position in favor of merging the Arab parties into one joint list for the Knesset elections (over 80 percent). 4. Weariness with the intifada and a desire that it cease or become a non-violent struggle. 5. A position that Arab citizens in Israel have no active role in the Palestinian intifada, except for moral, financial or political support. 6. Support for the solution of two states alongside each other, and an increase as compared to previous years in the number of those willing to move to the Palestinian State, either actively or by the annexation of their communities to it. But this is still a minority of about 17-18%. 7. A desire to improve internal relations between themselves and the Jews, and willingness to take an active part in joint activity whose goal is to improve the relations between the two communities.

Survey of Political and National Attitudes of the Arabs in Israel Goal of the Survey: The goal of the survey is to get a picture of the positions of the adult Arab population regarding its formal and informal representative institutions, as well as various current topics which are on the public agenda of the Arab population in Israel, including the intention to participate in elections. The questions the survey was intended to answer were: Positions regarding participation in elections to the 16th Knesset, and support for the contending parties in the political arena. Attitudes regarding the institutions and bodies which represent the interests of the Arab population. Evaluation of the performance of the current Arab leadership and the extent of its handling of issues relating to the population. The extent of support for creating an elected representative body for the Arabs in Israel. Feelings regarding the proposal to declare the Islamic Movement illegal. Positions regarding the intifada and solutions to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Attitudes regarding annexation of Arab communities adjacent to the Green Line to the future Palestinian State. Methodology: The public opinion survey was conducted by means of telephone interviews amongst a representative sample of the adult Arab population. The target population was aged 18 and over, the sample unit was every household having at least one telephone instrument (the population in the unrecognized villages and the population not having a telephone were not included in our sample). The sample system we used is a layered sample, in which we divided the Arab population into 13 geographical areas. In each layer we conducted a clustered sample. Each layer included a number of communities and from these we sampled selected communities. In each community we conducted a systematic sample. The maximum margin of error is 4% and the size of the sample was 756 persons polled. The poll was held at the offices of “Yafa” in Nazareth, time of the polling was between 1:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m., from October 25-30, 2002. Immediately after the conclusion of the survey early elections were declared, and we therefore repeated the questions on intention to vote and for which parties the respondents intend to vote. The supplement to the survey took place November 8-9, 2002. A structured questionnaire in Arabic was designed by the Jewish-Arab Center for Peace and the “Yafa” Institute. Most of the questions were closed and for many of them there were assisted questions. The questionnaire included variables which were required by the research questions, in addition to demographic variables. (See Appendix B.) Details of the Findings: Demographic Characteristics of the Respondent Population (Table A, 1-10): - The respondent population included 13 geographical regions and some 30 Arab communities. - Distribution of the population by gender: 48% male and 52% female. - The average age of the respondent population is 34, the median 31, 58% of the pollees are between 18-34, 22% in the 35-44 age group, and the remainder 45 years and above. - 30% of those polled are single and 68% married, the average number of persons in the household is 5.5 and the median 5, the most frequent number of persons in the household is 5-6 – 39% of the households have this number of persons. - 81% of the respondent population are Muslims, 10% Christians and 9% Druze; the self-definition of those polled showed that 59% describe themselves as traditional, 23.4% as religious and 17.6% as secular. - The average number of years of education of the respondent population is 11.75, and the median is 12 years of education. The highest concentration of the population, 43.7%, is in the group of 11-12 years. - 25% of the respondent population belong to families with an income of NIS 6000 net per month, an additional 25% have a higher income. The remaining 50% stated that their family income is less than NIS 6000 net per month. The bodies which represent the interest of the Arabs in Israel (Table B, 1-5): The findings of the survey show that the Israeli parliamentary bodies which were elected by the public, are those which in the main express the interests of those polled; nearly 47% stated this, with a tendency that the Arab side is the one which expresses the interests more than others. 26.4% of the respondents stated that the Arab Members of Knesset represent their interests, 11.3% stated that the government expresses their interests, 7.2% cited the Knesset and 1.9% cited the Jewish Members of Knesset belonging to the Israeli Left; in comparison, 7.7% cited the Follow-Up Committee which is a non-parliamentary body, 6.6% cited the public associations (NGO’S) which are active in the Arab sector. One-third of those polled noted that there is no body whatever which represents their interests. This response, in addition to the low evaluation given by those polled to the performance of the representative bodies, should place a question mark on the relationship between these bodies and the voting public, and to the feeling within wide circles of the Arab populace that there is in fact no one advancing their ongoing civic matters. In the Negev Region 33.5% stated that the Arab Members of Knesset represent their interests, and 15.4% cited the government as representative. In comparison, approximately 31% stated that there is no body which represents their interests. Similar results were obtained in the mixed cities, in the Triangle and the Galilee. The picture is different in the Coastal Region and the Carmel, which has a large Druze population – 54% stated there is no body representing their interests. The differences in representation of interests are clearly varied by religion; the Druze stated that the government and the Knesset represent their interests more than the Muslims and the Christians. The Muslims noted that the Arab Members of Knesset and the Follow-Up Committee represent them more than the Christians and the Druze. As expected, there is also a clear difference based on years of education. Those with a higher education noted that the Follow-Up Committee and the NGO’s represent them, more than those with less education. Evaluation of the Performance of the Arab Leadership (Table B, 2-9): 20.5% rate the performance of the current Arab leadership between good to excellent, 42.4% rate the performance as fair, 37.1% rate the performance between bad to very bad. Evaluation of the performance of the leadership shows the clear differences between men and women. Women rate the performance of the current leadership higher than men. In comparison, there are no clear differences in evaluation between age groups, education groups and religions. In order to get a picture regarding the constituents of the current leadership, the respondents were asked a number of questions regarding Arab Knesset Members and the Supreme Follow-Up Committee. Nearly 21% of the respondents stated that the Arab Members of Knesset handle the matters of the Arab population well, 47.5% noted they handle them in a fair manner, and almost 32% stated that they do not do so at all. 23% stated that the Supreme Follow-Up Committee represents the entire Arab population, 33.8% said it represents them on a fair level, and nearly 43% noted that the Follow-Up Committee does not represent the overall Arab populace. The findings did not show differences of opinion of the respondents based on various demographic variables, and the trend is that there is similarity amongst all sections of the population. To the question whether the Arab parties implement the decisions of the Supreme Follow-Up Committee, 7% of the respondents replied that they always do, 52.6% think that the Arab parties implement the decisions of the Follow-Up Committee sometimes, and 35% stated that in their opinion the parties do not implement the decisions of the Supreme Follow-Up Committee at all. The responses are similar regarding implementation of decisions of the Follow-Up Committee by the Local Councils, where 4.1% of the respondents said the Councils always implement these decisions, 52.6% said sometimes, and nearly 32% stated that the Councils do not implement the decisions of the Supreme Follow-Up Committee at all. In light of the questions relating to the overall Arab populace, we attempted to examine whether the Supreme Follow-Up Committee represents the respondents personally. The findings showed that only 18.5% stated that the Follow-Up Committee represents them, 23.7% replied “somewhat,” and a majority of 57.9% stated that the Follow-Up Committee does not represent them at all. In this context a clear difference was found between men and women; men stated in higher percentages that the Supreme Follow-Up Committee does represent them. Here as well the gap between the populace and the institution which is supposed to represent them before government bodies, a body which is considered to be the most faithful expresser of the interests and desires of the Arab population in Israel, must be noted. When we presented to the respondents a question, the main point of which was who most advances the interests of the Arabs in Israel by comparison between the Arab Members of Knesset and the NGO’s, 36.6% noted that the organizations better advance their interests as compared to 24.8% who stated that the Knesset Members do so. 29% responded that both advance their interests on the same level. Positions regarding election of a representative body of the Arabs in Israel (Table B, 8): Positions of the respondents regarding holding of elections for a representative body of the Arabs in Israel, a quasi-Parliament, are favorable; 73.5% stated they are in favor of holding elections for such a body, 19.7% are against, and 6.8% have no opinion. It was found that there is a clear difference between men and women; women are more in favor of holding such elections than men. In addition, clear differences were found according to religion, where the Muslims are more in favor of creating such a body than the Christians and the Druze. In comparison, there are no differences in the groupings by number of years of education and age groups. Positions regarding the proposal to declare the Islamic Movement illegal (Table B, 10-11): The proposal to declare the Islamic Movement illegal is seen as racist amongst 59.1% of those polled, and as an intention to harm the entire Arab minority amongst 20.8%. However, 12.1% see the proposal as a justified one. There are no differences in these positions by age or education, but there is a clear difference according to religion, where the rate of Muslims who stated that this is a racist proposal is higher than the rate of Christians and Druze who stated this. Amongst the populace who stated that the proposal is justified, higher rates were found amongst the Druze, followed by the Christians and with the Muslims in last place. However, should this proposal pass, 20.1% of the respondents believe that it will not influence the political behavior of the Arabs in Israel, 19.8% noted that the acceptance of this proposal would cause a boycott of the elections to the Knesset, 20.2% believe there would be a move to other parties, 33.1% think that an Islamic movement or party would arise under another name, and the remainder have no opinion on the subject. The “Palestinian problem,” solutions and positions regarding the intifada (Table B, 12): The establishment of a Palestinian state alongside the State of Israel within the 1967 borders is the most appropriate solution in the eyes of 47% of those polled, in addition to 30% who agree to two states with agreed-upon border adjustments. That is, a decisive majority of 77% supports “two states for two peoples,” even in the current political situation. The remainder supported other solutions such as a secular state – 9.2%, a bi-national state – 3.7%, and an Islamic state – 4.8%. The opinions regarding solutions are similar amongst both sexes and all levels of education, but there are differences by age, where those of age 35 and above support a withdrawal to the 1967 borders more than those aged 18-35. The younger respondents agree less to border adjustments, even if they are agreed upon. They are also more in favor of a secular or bi-national state, in comparison with other age groups. In addition, differences were found according to religion in positions regarding solution of the conflict, where the Christians see border adjustments in the agreement as a solution more than do the Muslims. The attitude to the proposal to annex Arab communities in the Triangle Region and in the Northern Negev to the future Palestinian state is not favored. 61.3% do not agree to this proposal, and only 17.6% agree. Those who agree are more women, younger, and with 11-14 years of education. Amongst the Druze the proposal receives more agreement than amongst the Christians and the Muslims. When discussing personal willingness to join the Palestinian state the rates change; 11.5% agree and 77.9% are not ready to do so. Personal willingness is higher amongst the women and the younger age group, those with 13-14 years and more of education, and amongst Muslims than Christians and Druze. The motivations for joining the future Palestinian state are the fact that they are Palestinians – 61.4% stated this reason; 24.1% stated that their motivation for joining is the existence of manifestations of racism against Arabs in Israel, and amongst 10.8% the motivation for willingness to joint the Palestinian state is having family there. Amongst the populace which is not willing to join, the main motivations are: 48.6% stated that they have become used to living in the State of Israel, 32.5% stated that their joining the Palestinian State means giving up their homeland. 5.1% noted that the economic situation is better in Israel, 1.2% stated that the social situation is better, and 4.4% said that all the answers are correct. Improvement of relations between Jews and Arabs and willingness to participate in such activities (Table B, 17-18): Our point of reference is that the relations between Jews and Arabs have suffered a serious blow in the recent period, especially after the events of October 2000. In light of this we presented to the respondents a question regarding the way to improve relations between Jewish and Arab citizens of the State. 31% stated that joint social, economic and encounter activity is the way to improve relations. 36% stated that by achieving equality between Arabs and Jews, relations can be improved; 10.2% noted that the method is by joint political activity. In the proposal of ways to improve relations no differences were found between religious, education, age and gender groupings. Nearly 65% stated that they are ready to personally participate in activity aimed at improving relations between Arab and Jewish citizens of the State. Position regarding the intifada and the role of Arab citizens in it (Table B, 19-21): 65% of those polled said it would be preferable for the current intifada to cease, 19.3% noted it would be preferable for it to continue and 12.5% have no opinion on the subject. In these positions there are no clear differences between men and women and between different age groups, but there are clear differences between levels of education, where those with lower education prefer the intifada to cease at a higher rate than those with higher education. In addition, Druze are more interested in the cessation of the intifada than Muslims and Christians. Support for the intifada becoming non-violent on both sides (the Palestinians and the Israelis) is high; 83% agree to this and those opposed are 13.3%. There are differences between those agreeing to a non-violent intifada; the Christians agree with this more than the Druze and the Muslims. The preferred role for Arab citizens in Israel in the intifada is bringing political pressure on the government and the Israeli public to withdraw from the West Bank and Gaza; 23.7% stated this. In comparison, 22.2% stated that it is preferable for the role of the Arabs in Israel to be in the form of moral and financial support, 17.5% said it is preferable that the Arabs in Israel hold joint demonstrations with the peace movements in Israel, 15.6% noted that it is preferable for the Arabs in Israel to play no role, and 10.3% say that the Arabs cannot play any role in the current conflict. Evaluation of the performance of the government (Table B, 24): The evaluation of the performance of the current government headed by Ariel Sharon, in the opinion of the respondents, shows that 78.4% rate it as bad or very bad, 16.4% rate it as fair and 5.2% replied that it is between good to excellent. In the evaluation of the performance there are no differences amongst the various cross-sections of the population, and only in the variable of years of schooling is there a clear difference – where those rating the government’s performance as good to excellent are found in the groups with lower education. Participation in Knesset elections and patterns of voting (Table B, 22-23): A question was presented to the respondents on the subject of participation in voting for the Knesset, and the question was ‘if the elections were held today, would you participate in them?’ The responses showed that 47.8% would participate in the elections, 37.7% would not participate and 14.4% have not decided. Characteristics of the population by various cross-sectioning shows that there is a clear difference between participation of the men and participation of the women, where men will participate more in the elections. There are of course differences by age groups, where the young will participate the least and the educated will participate more; clear differences between rate of participation in elections by religion do not exist, but there is a trend that the Muslims will participate the least and the Druze will participate in the elections more than the Christians and the Muslims. As noted, in the repeat questioning, after early elections were declared and scheduled for the end of January 2003, the number of those who have decided to vote rose to 54.6%, a rate much lower than those who actually participated in the elections in 1999 (about 75%) and in 1996 (about 77%). The percentage will rise the closer elections become, and it is likely that some of the 15% undecided will in the end go to the polls. But we should like to point out the fact that today already 30% of those polled have decided not to vote. We assume that this is a decision in principle, and possibly even ideological, and not a technical abstention (sickness, travel abroad, work and the like). This attests to the distancing from the political system, disappointment with its performance and its ability to mobilize processes for the benefit of the Arab population, and an expression of no-confidence in the democratic system. In addition, it should be remembered that the last elections in Israel, which were held in February 2001, were only for Prime Minister, at which time a general campaign to boycott the elections was organized by the majority of the Arab parties. Two years later, a portion of the population has not yet absorbed the return to the system of one voting slip, another portion will react cynically to the call of Arab politicians that this time they should go to the polls, since some of them are running for election, and another portion will continue on the previous course of boycott. Immediately after the declaration of early elections a debate began amongst the Arabs, in the media and other public circles, regarding the value of voting. This will become stronger as the date nears. In addition, the Arab political system has not yet stabilized as of the date of this survey and the writing of this paper (end of November 2002), and mergers, agreements and divisions between the political parties and personalities can affect voting behavior.

APPENDIX A Demographic Data 1. Distribution by region: Region Percent Negev 10.3 Mixed Cities 10.3 Coast (Faradis + Jiser) 2.0 Carmel 3.2 Southern Triangle 9.4 Northern Triangle 10.8 Nazareth 16.5 Jezreel Valley 5.2 Sakhnin Rift 7.3 Shfar’am 9.0 Beit HaKerem 3.7 Western Galilee 6.1 Upper Galilee 6.2 Total 100.00 N 756 2. Distribution by gender: Gender Percent Men 48.0 Women 52.0 Total 100.00 N 756 3. Distribution by age groups (years): Age Group (Years) Percent 18-24 28.0 25-34 30.0 35-44 22.3 45-54 10.2 55-65 5.3 65+ 4.1 Average 34.13 Median 31.00 Total 100.00 N 754 4. Distribution by family status: Family Status Percent Unmarried 29.9 Married 68.6 Widowed/Divorced 1.5 Total 100.00 N 755 5. Self-definition: Self-Definition Percent Traditional 59.0 Religious 23.4 Secular 17.6 Total 100.00 N 756 6. Religion: Religion Percent Muslim 81.1 Christian 10.0 Druze 8.9 Total 100.00 N 751 7. Distribution by years of education: Years of Education Percent 0-8 16.6 9-10 12.1 11-12 43.7 13-14 8.3 15+ 19.3 Average 11.75 Median 12.00 Total 100.00 N 751 8. Distribution by employment status: Employment Status Percent Salaried worker 31.7 Self-employed 14.0 Unemployed 11.8 Student 9.8 Housewife 26.9 Retired 5.3 Other 0.5 Total 100.00 N 755 9. Distribution by number of persons in the household (including parents): Number of Persons Percent 1-2 9.1 3-4 23.6 5-6 38.8 7-8 20.4 9+ 7.9 Average 5.5 Median 5.00 Total 100.00 N 752 10. Distribution by net household income, assuming that the average net income is NIS 6,000 per month: Income Percent Much higher than the average 5.6 Higher than the average 18.9 Average 24.6 Less than the average 31.9 Much less than the average 19.1 Total 100.00 N 753

APPENDIX B Responses to the Questionnaire 1. The body which best expresses your interests in the State of Israel: Response Percent The government 11.3 The Knesset 7.2 The Arab Members of Knesset 26.4 Jewish Members of Knesset who belong to the Israeli left 1.9 The Supreme Follow-up Committee 7.7 Public associations and institutions (NGO’s) 6.1 No one 33.4 No opinion 4.0 Other 2.1 Total 100.00 N 754 2. How do you rate the functioning of the current leadership of the Arabs in Israel: Response Percent Excellent 4.2 Good 16.3 Fair 42.4 Bad 16.0 Very Bad 21.1 Total 100.00 N 755 3. In your opinion, do the Arab Members of Knesset handle the affairs of the Arab population: Response Percent Definitely yes 6.8 Yes 13.8 Somewhat 47.5 No 15.9 Not at all 15.9 Total 100.00 N 753 4. In your opinion, does the Supreme Follow-up Committee represent the Arab population: Response Percent Definitely yes 7.7 Yes 15.3 Somewhat 33.8 No 30.1 Not at all 12.9 Don’t know 0.3 Total 100.00 N 754 5. In your opinion, do the political parties carry out the decisions of the Supreme Follow-up Committee: Response Percent Always 7.0 Sometimes 54.2 Don’t carry out 35.1 Don’t know 3.7 Total 100.00 N 747 6. In your opinion, do the Local Councils carry out the decisions of the Supreme Follow-up Committee: Response Percent Always 14.1 Sometimes 52.6 Don’t carry out 31.3 Don’t know 2.0 Total 100.00 N 753 7. Does the Supreme Follow-up Committee represent you personally: Response Percent Definitely yes 6.5 Yes 11.9 Somewhat 23.7 Doesn’t represent me 33.3 Doesn’t represent me at all 24.6 Total 100.00 N 756 8. Are you in favor of holding elections for a representative Arab body (quasi-Parliament): Response Percent Yes 73.5 No 19.7 I have no opinion 6.8 Total 100.00 N 756 9. In your opinion, who most advances the concerns of the Arabs in Israel: Response Percent The elected Arab Members of Knesset 24.8 The Arab public associations (NGO’S) 36.6 Both at the same level 29.0 Neither 5.8 No opinion 1.2 Other 2.6 Total 100.00 N 755 10. What is your opinion on the proposal to declare the Islamic Movement illegal: Response Percent Racist decision 59.1 Decision meant to injure the entire Arab minority in Israel 20.8 Justified decision 12.1 Don’t know 1.7 Unjustified decision 0.9 Racist decision and meant to injure the Arab minority 1.3 No opinion 3.6 Other 0.3 Total 100.00 N 751 11. A proposal exists to declare the Islamic Movement illegal. How in your opinion will such a proposal influence the political behavior of the Arabs: Response Percent Will not influence the political behavior of the Arabs in Israel 20.1 Will cause a boycott of the Knesset elections 19.8 Will cause a transfer to other parties 20.2 Will cause the establishment of an Islamic movement or party under another name 33.1 No opinion 2.6 Don’t know 1.1 Other 3.1 Total 100.00 N 756 12. What in your opinion is the most appropriate solution to the “Palestinian problem”: Response Percent A Palestinian State alongside the State of Israel in the 1967 borders 46.9 Establishment of two states with agreed border adjustments 30.1 Establishment of one state for Arabs and Jews (secular state) 9.2 Establishment of a bi-national state 3.7 Establishment of an Islamic state on all the lands of Palestine 4.8 No opinion 3.2 Other 2.1 Total 100.00 N 753 13. A proposal exists to annex Arab cities and towns adjacent to the borders with Palestine in the Triangle Region and the Northern Negev. Do you agree with the annexation of these areas to a future Palestinian state: Response Percent Agree 17.6 Disagree 61.3 Haven’t thought about this subject 21.1 Total 100.00 N 754 14. In the event that an independent Palestinian state is established, are you ready to join the Palestinian State and relinquish your Israeli identity: Response Percent Yes 11.5 No 77.9 Haven’t thought about it 10.6 Total 100.00 N 756 15. Why do you prefer to join the Palestinian State: Response Percent Because I am a Palestinian 61.4 Because of the existence of manifestations of racism against the Arabs in Israel 24.1 My family and relatives live in the Palestinian State 10.8 All of the above 3.6 Total 100.00 N 83 16. Why do you prefer to remain in the State of Israel: Response Percent My joining the Palestinian State means giving up my homeland (brotherhood of the Arabs in Israel) 32.5 The economic situation is better 5.1 The social situation is better 1.2 I feel more freedom 8.3 I have become used to living in the State of Israel 48.6 All of the above 4.4 Total 100.00 N 591 17. How can we improve the relations between the Arab and Jewish citizens of Israel: Response Percent By means of joint social and economic activity and encounters 30.9 By means of joint political activity 10.2 There is no need, or it is very difficult to improve the relations 13.5 I have no opinion 5.4 By means of equality between Arabs and Jews 35.6 Other 4.4 Total 100.00 N 717 18. Are you interested in participating in such activities: Response Percent Yes 64.4 No 25.8 No opinion 9.5 I have no time 0.3 Total 100.00 N 756 19. What is your position regarding the current intifada: Response Percent It is preferable that it cease 65.1 It is preferable that it continue 19.3 No opinion 12.5 Cessation of the intifada under certain conditions 3.2 Total 100.00 N 753 20. The following is an opinion which states that the Palestinian intifada should become an intifada in which neither side (the Palestinians and the Israelis) will use violence. Do you agree with this opinion: Response Percent Definitely yes 60.5 Yes 22.5 No opinion 6.4 No 6.9 Definitely no 3.7 Total 100.00 N 754 21. In your opinion, should the Arabs in Israel play a role in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict: Response Percent No, it is preferable that the Arabs in Israel play a neutral role 15.6 No, this subject does not interest the Arabs in Israel 1.9 Yes, it is preferable that the role of the Arabs in Israel be in the form of moral and financial support 22.2 Yes, it is preferable that the Arabs in Israel play a political role, mainly in bringing pressure on the government and Israeli public to withdraw from the West Bank and Gaza 23.7 Yes, it is preferable that the Arabs in Israel hold demonstrations for peace with the peace movements in Israel 17.5 Yes, it is preferable that the Arabs in Israel should hold public Arab demonstrations of solidarity with the intifada 3.4 No, the Arabs cannot play a role in the current conflict 10.3 No opinion 4.6 Other 0.7 Total 100.00 N 756 22. If the Knesset elections were held today would you vote: (The question was asked prior to the declaration of early elections) Response Percent Yes 47.8 No 37.7 Haven’t decided 14.4 Total 100.00 N 755 23. For which party will you vote: (The question was asked prior to the declaration of early elections) Response Percent Labor Party 15.9 Likud 3.8 United Arab List (UAL) 10.7 Tajam’u 10.7 Jabha 14.8 Arab Movement for Change (Ahmad Tibi) 5.2 National Arab Party (Mohammad Kana’an) 1.1 Meretz 7.4 Shas 0.3 Haven’t decided 21.1 White slip 0.3 Confidential 7.4 Arab party 1.1 Total 100.00 N 364 24. How do you rate the performance of the current government towards the Arabs in Israel: Response Percent Excellent 0.9 Good 4.3 Fair 16.4 Bad 17.7 Very Bad 60.7 Total 100.00 N 751

APPENDIX C Questionnaire regarding voting in elections, after the declaration of early elections in January 2003 (Date of the survey: November 8-9, 2002) Demographic Data 1. Distribution by gender: Gender Percent Men 46.7 Women 53.3 Total 100.00 N 508 2. Distribution by age: Age Group Percent 18-24 24.1 25-34 30.6 35-44 25.4 45-54 8.7 55+ 11.2 Average 35.3 Median 33.00 Total 100.00 N 507 3. Distribution by family status: Family Status Percent Unmarried 24.0 Married 75.4 Widowed/Divorced 0.6 Total 100.00 N 508 4. Distribution by years of education: Years of Education Percent 0-8 20.3 9-12 52.2 13-14 6.9 15+ 20.7 Average 11.47 Median 12.00 Total 100.00 N 508 5. Distribution by religion: Religion Percent Muslim 79.9 Christian 11.5 Druze 8.5 Total 100.00 N 503 6. Distribution by number of persons in the household (including parents): Number of Persons Percent 0-2 10.7 3-4 27.5 5-6 34.0 7-8 18.8 9+ 9.2 Average 5.44 Median 5.00 Total 100.00 N 506 7. Distribution by net household income, assuming that the average net income is NIS 6,000 per month: Income Percent Much higher than the average 4.3 Higher than the average 19.2 Average 23.1 Less than the average 34.8 Much less than the average 18.6 Total 100.00 N 506 8. Distribution by employment status: Employment Status Percent Salaried worker 30.4 Self-employed 11.4 Unemployed 10.8 Student 10.8 Housewife 29.8 Retired 6.3 Other 0.4 Total 100.00 N 507 9. Distribution by region: Region Percent Negev 10.0 Mixed Cities 9.8 Coast 4.3 Carmel 3.1 Southern Triangle 9.6 Northern Triangle 11.2 Nazareth area 16.9 Jezreel Valley 5.1 Sakhnin Rift 7.9 Shfar’am 8.9 Beit Kerem 3.7 Western Galilee 6.1 Upper Galilee 3.1 Total 100.00 N 508

The Questionnaire 1. Will you participate in the Knesset elections to be held in January 2003: Response Percent Yes 54.6 No 30.0 Haven’t decided 15.4 Total 100.00 N 508 2. For which party will you vote: Response Percent United Arab List (UAL) 17.6 Jabha (Hadash) 16.2 Tajam’u (Azmi Bishara) 11.9 Arab Movement for Change (Ahmad Tibi) 11.5 National Arab Party (Mohammad Kana’an) 2.5 Labor Party 12.6 Likud 6.8 Meretz 8.3 Shas 0.4 National Religious Party (NRP – Mafdal) 0.4 Am Echad 0.4 Haven’t decided 5.4 White slip 2.2 Confidential 4.0 Total 100.00 N 278 3. Are you in favor of the establishment of one Arab list which will run for the next Knesset and include within it all the Arab parties: Response Percent Yes 80.7 No 10.4 No opinion 8.9 Total 100.00 N 508

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